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The Butterfly Effect of Politics over
Principle: The Debate over the Unborn
Victims of Violence Act and the
Motherhood Protection Act
Robert Steinbuch*
I. Introduction
In 2003, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act' (UVVA) was
reintroduced in the Senate.2 Examining the debate led me to
the perhaps obvious realization that politics over principle too
often directed the discourse on this complex and nuanced issue.
Both sides were pursuing a largely common goal, but they could
not find common language for the legislation. I believe that
agreement eluded the parties because of the respective agendas
that accompanied their legislative proposals.
II. Analysis
The UVVA became known as "Laci and Conner's Law," in
memory of the Laci Peterson case. Laci Peterson was a preg-
nant, twenty-seven year old substitute teacher from Modesto,
California, who was murdered by her husband, Scott Peterson.'
Scott Peterson claimed that he returned from a fishing trip and
found the family dog wandering and his wife missing.4
The New York Times described some of the subsequent sali-
ent facts of the case when it noted that:
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia. J.D. from, and John
M. Olin Law & Economics Fellow at, Columbia Law School. B.A. and M.A. from the
University of Pennsylvania. The author wishes to thank Professors Pearl Steinbuch,
Richard Peltz, and Frances Fendler for their guidance and contributions, and Matthew
Runge, Jonathan Rosen and Janiella Shirley for their insights and assistance.
I Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568
(codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841); see also infra Appendix A.
2 See NAT'L ORG. FOR WOMEN http://www.now.org/issues/legislat/200305.html#
unborn.
3 See id.
4 Carolyn Marshall, Jury Finds Scott Peterson Guilty of Wife's Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/13/national/1 3peterson.html.
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* "The remains of Ms. Peterson and her unborn son, whom the
couple had planned to name Conner, washed ashore in April
2003."5
a "The jury found Mr. Peterson, [thirty-two], guilty of first-
degree murder for the death of his wife, Laci, who was eight
months pregnant, and of second-degree murder for the death
of the fetus."6
* "Scott Peterson, the Modesto fertilizer salesman whose mur-
der trial stoked the nation's appetite for real-life courtroom
drama, was found guilty on Friday of killing his wife and un-
born child in 2002." 7
The vernacular used by the New York Times, often de-
scribed as the nation's "paper of record,"8 and typically consid-
ered modestly "liberal,"9 illustrates the underlying controversy
with the legislation. In some instances, the Times characterized
Connor as Laci's "unborn son" and "unborn child."' In others,
the Times portrayed Connor as a "fetus."" Was Connor an "un-
born child" or a "fetus"? Was Connor something else? Is there a
difference? Does it matter?
In the milieu of the continuing debate on abortion, lan-
guage matters. The "Right to Life" movement calls its oppo-
nents "abortionists" or "pro-abortion."'1 2  The "Pro-Choice"
movement denominates its opponents as "anti-choice."'" By
controlling language, the advocates hope to shape opinion and,
ultimately, political outcomes.1 4 Pro-life advocates argue that
5 See id. (emphasis added).
6 See id. (emphasis added).
7 See id. (emphasis added).
8 Daniel Okrent, THE PUBLIC EDITOR, Paper of Record? No Way, No Reason, No
Thanks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.
html?res=9D02E1D8123AF936A15757COA9629C8B63.
9 Daniel Okrent, THE PUBLIC EDITOR; Is The New York Times a Liberal Newspaper?,
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2004, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9D01E7D8173DF936A15754COA9629C8B63.
10 Marshall, supra note 4.
11 Id.
12 NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE, http://www.nrlc.org/FOCA/LawmakersProposeFOCA.
html.
13 See NARAL, PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, BUSH NOMINEE RICHARD HONAKER'S WITH-
DRAWAL MARKS PRO-CHOICE GRASSROOTS VICTORY, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/
news/press-releases/2008/prl 1142008_honaker.html.
14 Throughout this paper, I will be discussing issues and concepts defined differ-
ently by the various groups involved. I will endeavor to use the language acceptable to
all-well, likely most, at best. This will often require at least two formulations of rele-
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the mother's interests1 5 cannot trump those of the unborn child.
Pro-choice advocates argue that the mother's interests generally
control the outcome of her pregnancy. To bolster their posi-
tions, pro-life advocates argue that the unborn child is a full per-
son, while pro-choice advocates argue along a spectrum that the
fetus is not life or is not a full person.
Given this political landscape, it was not, therefore, greatly
surprising that the National Organization for Women (NOW),
and other groups with similar philosophies, characterized the
UVVA as an issue of "reproductive rights" and bemoaned the
fact that "George W. Bush has made it clear that he is anxious to
sign just such an anti-reproductive rights bill into law, should
both the House and the Senate pass it."' 6 NOW was concerned
that the UVVA "would elevate fetal rights and establish the legal
personhood of a fetus,"' 7 and that by statutorily protecting the
"unborn child" and assigning criminal liability to its unwanted
destruction, the federal government would "accord[ ] statutory
legal status to fetuses at all stages of prenatal development,
[and] undermine[ ] the foundation of the Roe v. Wade
decision."18
However, the stated purpose behind the UVVA was not to
dramatically shift the legal landscape. Thirty-five states currently
vant terms, and will undoubtedly be somewhat labored. In certain instances, out of
convenience and in an effort to minimize verbosity, I will use the term(s) favored by the
group that I am discussing. This should not be construed as an endorsement of one
view over another. Moreover, in this piece, I have not endorsed any position on the
issue of abortion, which divided the left and right on what otherwise was a generally
accepted principle-that the destruction/killing, against the will of an expectant
mother, of what the expectant mother is carrying is deserving of serious sanction. I
intentionally do not state a position, or whether I have a position, because I believe that
doing otherwise will shut off open discussion. Indeed, a corollary of the thesis of this
paper-that language is overtaking policy because of political agendas-is that the par-
ties to this debate have difficulty seeing past the meta-views of their opposites and focus-
ing on the specific issue at hand. I have tried to adopt this "agnostic" approach
elsewhere when discussing controversial issues. See, e.g., Robert Steinbuch, Reforming
Federal Death Penalty Procedures: Four Modest Proposals to Improve the Administration of the
Ultimate Penalty, 40 IND. L. REv. 97 (2007).
15 It is difficult to choose the right word for this point. In this context, "interest"
embodies many concepts, including medical, social, and religious views; concepts of
autonomy and life; and preferences and desires, among others.
16 See NAT'L ORG. FOR WOMEN, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, "UNBORN VICTIMS" ACT DOES
NOTHING TO DETER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (2003), http://www.now.org/issues/
legislat/200305.html#unborn.
17 See id.
18 See id.
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have some legislation that punishes the "killing of an unborn
child" or "involuntary termination of a wanted pregnancy," -
depending on how one chooses to characterize it, as homicide in
at least some circumstances.19 Nearly as many states (twenty-
nine) had such laws at the time that the UVVA was under consid-
eration.2 ° Moreover, the problem being addressed by the UVVA
was not disputed. The bill's sponsor in the Senate-Mike
DeWine, a strongly Pro-Life, politically moderate, Republican
from Ohio-described several cases that were addressed by state
analogs of the UVVA.21
NOW's political characterization that the UVVA was "part of
the anti-reproductive rights forces' agenda to dismantle Roe v.
Wade,12 2 however, was not necessarily wrong for all on the right.
Some of those who supported the UVVA were decidedly "Pro-
Life" or "anti-choice"-depending on who does the naming-
and these supporters may have seen the UVVA as a means to
advance their political agenda. In response to this accusation,
though, proponents of the UVVA pointed to the following lan-
guage in the bill:
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the
prosecution-
(1) of any person for conduct relating to an abortion for
which the consent of the pregnant woman, or a person au-
thorized by law to act on her behalf, has been obtained or for
which such consent is implied by law;
(2) of any person for any medical treatment of the pregnant
woman or her unborn child; or
(3) of any woman with respect to her unborn child.
19 NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE, http://www.nrlc.org/Unbornvictims/Statehomicidelaws
092302.html.
20 150 Cong. Rec. S3124-02, at S3126 (2004).
21 See id. at S3130. Senator DeWine gave several such examples. He described
how Airman Gregory beat his eight-month pregnant wife, ending the pregnancy. Air
Force prosecutors could not prosecute under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or
federal law. The only federal crime was for the assault on the mother. So prosecutors
bootstrapped Ohio's unborn victims law to prosecute Airman Robbins. This was far
from a certain approach, but was ultimately upheld. U.S. v. Robbins, 48 M.J. 745 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. 1998). Similarly, Shiwona Pace of Little Rock, Arkansas, was days away
from giving birth. Her boyfriend, Eric Bullock, hired three thugs to beat her and kill
her unborn baby. Bullock v. State, 111 S.W.3d 380 (Ark. 2003). Bullock was convicted
under the "Fetal Protection Act," which Arkansas passed just a few weeks before the
assault. ARK. CODE ANN. §5-1-102 (2005).
22 See NAT'L ORG. FOR WOMEN, supra note 2.
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But the opponents of the bill were not convinced. Senator
Feinstein said that
[a]lthough the text of the amendment itself technically pro-
vides an exception for abortion, experts on both sides of this
issue agree the language in the bill will clearly place into Fed-
eral law a definition of life that will chip away at the right to
choose as outlined in Roe v. Wade.23
While Senator Feinstein and organizations such as NOW,
the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League
(NARAL), and the Religious Coalition for Reproductive Choice
(RCRC) agreed that lawmakers should take steps to prevent as-
saults on pregnant women and severely punish those who com-
mit such assaults, they did not believe that the UVVA was the
appropriate way to achieve that important goal. Besides their
objection to the legal protection of a wanted fetus, the bill's op-
ponents were also concerned that the legislation would divert
the attention of the justice system away from violence against
women.
24
These opponents favored another bill, the Motherhood Pro-
tection Act 25 (MPA), which Representative Zoe Lofgren and Sen-
ator Diane Feinstein, both Democrats from California,
introduced as an alternative to the UVVA.26 While the UVVA
penalized harming an "unborn child," defined as "any member
of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is
carried in the womb, ' 27 the MPA created a separate criminal of-
fense for harming a pregnant woman without establishing any
23 See NAT'L RIGHT TO LiFE, http://www.nrlc.org/Unborn_- Victims/index.html
(follow "Read the historic Senate Debate on the Unborn Victims of Violence Act"
hyperlink); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (2008).
24 For NARAL's perspective of the UVVA, seeJulie Foster, Congress Debates Protecting
Unborn, WORLDNET DAILY EXCLUSIvE, Apr. 26, 2001, available at http://www.worldnet
daily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=22577. For RCRC's view of the UVVA, see
http://aclu.procon.org/viewanswers.asp?questionID=678.
25 H.R. 2247, 108th Cong. (2003). The full text of the version of this bill that was
offered as an alternative by Senator Diane Feinstein during the Senate debate is at-
tached as Appendix B. See infra Appendix B. The competing bill was actually somewhat
different. Senator Feinstein amended the MPA and tried to offer the new version dur-
ing the floor debate, but Senator DeWine objected. Senate Floor Debate, supra note 21.
The version discussed in this paper is the one that Senator Feinstein hoped to
introduce.
26 See NAT'L ORG. FOR WOMEN, supra note 2.
27 See id.
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crime against the fetus/unborn child.28 In order to fit into the
rubric that opponents of the UVVA described, proponents of the
MPA characterized the wrong being punished as "[t] he termina-
tion of a wanted pregnancy.... "29 Through this bill, opponents
of the UVVA asserted that they could address the same concern
as the UVA without implicating the issues of abortion and life.
So, was NOW right? Did the MPA create the same outcome
but without the controversy? Indeed, Senator Feinstein argued
this very point in the floor debate over the UVVA:
Our amendment, the Motherhood Protection Act, will ac-
complish the same goal as the Unborn Victims of Violence
Act, but will do so in a way that does not involve us in the
debate about abortion or when life begins. In my view, there
is no reason to vote against this substitute unless the intention
is to establish legally that human life, for the purposes of Fed-
eral criminal law, begins at the moment of conception be-
cause, ladies and gentlemen, that is exactly what this bill
does. 30
But in supporting the particular formulation in the MPA,
some on the left were pursuing their own political agenda-
much like they claimed of the right. The agenda was to avoid
conceding that at least some issues of potential life are impli-
cated in any attempt to protect women from the unwanted ter-
mination of a pregnancy. This goal resulted in tortured
language in the MPA.
The MPA provided the following penalty structure: "the
punishment for that separate offense [of causing the termina-
tion of a pregnancy or the interruption of the normal course of
pregnancy] is the same as the punishment provided [for that
conduct] under Federal law [ ] had that injury or death occurred
to the [pregnant woman]."31 While the italicized language re-
fers to the injury or death of the fetus/unborn child, the defini-
tion of "injury or death" of a fetus was never explicitly provided
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 Senate Floor Debate, supra note 20. Senator Feinstein submitted a letter from
Law Professor George Fisher-an outstanding jurist and academic-making this point.
The letter is perhaps the best articulation of this position, and is transcribed as Appen-
dix C. See infra Appendix C.
31 See Appendix A (emphasis added).
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in the bill. Additionally, under the MPA, "termination of a preg-
nancy" is equated to murder, although the MPA never recog-
nized any killing or death of the fetus. Indeed, in an effort to
support the confusing language of the MPA, which made no ref-
erence to a baby/child/fetus at all, Senator Feinstein stated that
"[i]f a fetus who dies during a crime is a murder victim, then
isn't abortion murder? '3 2 In order to address the political inter-
ests of her constituency, Senator Feinstein did not want to in-
clude any reference to a separate victim whatsoever.
While those on the right and the left proposed bills whose
language elevated, at the expense of clarity and consensus, their
respective ideological goals, there was a middle ground. During
the debate over the UVVA, Senator Feinstein admitted-per-
haps unwittingly-to supporting the California law under which
Scott Peterson was prosecuted."3 Thirty-four years before the de-
bate over the UVVA, California enacted a statute that defined
murder as "the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus,
with malice aforethought."34 During the part of the debate in
which she discussed the California statute, Senator Feinstein,
somewhat surprisingly, stated that "the use of the words 'or fetus'
makes a distinction between a human being and a fetus for pur-
poses of the application of the homicide statute. That is impor-
tant. And that is the law under which Laci Peterson's alleged
murderer is going to be prosecuted."35 In praising the use of the
term "fetus" over "unborn child" in the California statute-not-
withstanding her aforementioned objection to the use of the
term "fetus"-Senator Feinstein accepted the notion underlying
the California statute; that a separate crime exists for the homi-
cide or destruction of a fetus.
While a middle ground, in the form of the California stat-
ute, was available, neither side offered a bill with similar lan-
guage during the debate. Why? Perhaps from the perspective of
the UVVA supporters, they believed that there was no need. Af-
ter all, they succeeded with the language of "unborn child" over
"fetus." But at the time of the vote, success in the Senate was not
32 See Senate Floor Debate, supra note 20.
33 See id.
34 CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (2008).
35 Senate Floor Debate, supra note 20; see also 150 CONG. REc. § 3124 (2004).
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certain at all. Indeed, Feinstein's amendment failed by only one
vote,3 6 and thus, nobody knew what the outcome would be. So,
if the right had offered the California version, they would have
guaranteed the enactment of a statute that "works" over the sig-
nificant possibility of the enactment of the structurally flawed
MPA. Furthermore, adopting the California formulation would
have certainly garnered more votes than either the MPA or
UVVA given that Democrats and Republicans each expressed
support for either the California law itself or the ideas behind it.
So, the right would have given up the perceived political benefits
of their bill for a version that (1) ensured passage of legally en-
forceable language-unlike the MPA, and (2) enjoyed greater
support than either version actually offered.
While the right's political gamble paid off, why then didn't
the left offer a federal version of the California bill? They were
less likely to win with the MPA in the political climate at the
time. So, if they were concerned about having a positive effect
on the law, they should have tried to shape the outcome in some
fashion. Perhaps they simply thought that they would succeed.
After all, the Feinstein amendment failed by only one vote. And
while Senator Feinstein acknowledged supporting California's
version of the UVVA/MPA at one point, she also stated that " [i]f
a fetus who dies during a crime is a murder victim, then isn't
abortion murder?"37 She was pursuing this hard-line position of
the left, notwithstanding the absence of such a development in
California law. By offering the California statute, the left-just
as the right-would have guaranteed that a coherently written
statute passed with greater support than either offered version.
Moreover, the California statute would have allowed for
other laws, such as wrongful-death actions on behalf of involun-
36 Carl Hulse, "Senate Outlaws Injury to Fetus During Crime," N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
2004, available at http://www.lexis.com. The Feinstein amendment was in actuality es-
sentially the vote on the bill, because many on the left were not going to oppose the
final version of the bill regardless of the exact text. This was so for two reasons. First,
many on the left supported the ultimate purpose of either version of the bill-punish-
ing those who destroy/kill a fetus against the will of the mother-and they were not
going to let the language of the right interfere with their final vote. See id Second,
some on the left felt that failing to support the bill, which had wide popular support,
would be politically unwise. As a consequence, after the Feinstein amendment failed,
the vote on the final version of the bill was not particularly close (61-38). Id.
37 See Senate Floor Debate, supra note 20.
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tarily terminated, viable fetuses that the MPA may have
undermined.
For example, as of 2001,
[t]hirty-[three] jurisdictions permit a wrongful-death action
on behalf of a viable fetus. (Of those thirty-[three] jurisdic-
tions, four permit an action for an unviable fetus (Connecti-
cut, Missouri, South Dakota, and West Virginia)). Four
jurisdictions permit an action, even for unviable fetuses, but
have a live birth or stillbirth requirement (Louisiana, Mary-
land, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania). One jurisdiction per-
mits an alternative remedy by allowing an action for damages
resulting in stillbirth caused by negligence (Florida). One ju-
risdiction noted in dicta that a wrongful-death action might
be permitted but declined to reach the merits on procedural
grounds (Utah). Three jurisdictions prohibit an action for
an unborn nonviable fetus but have not reached the issue of
whether a viable fetus may maintain an action (Alaska, Ore-
gon, and Rhode Island). Four jurisdictions have no case law
on the issue (Colorado, Guam, Puerto Rico, and Wyoming).
Only [eight] jurisdictions . . . reject a wrongful-death action
for a viable fetus.38
In fact, my home state of Arkansas was the thirty-third state
to recognize a wrongful-death action on behalf of a viable fetus,
and Arkansas did so as an explicit consequence of its version of
the law punishing fetal homicide.3 9 The court that recognized
that cause of action reasoned aptly that if the state could prose-
cute a miscreant for attacking a women and killing, against her
will, that which she carries, a mother should be able to recover
for the same harm to the fetus or unborn child caused by negli-
gence of, say, a medical professional. By failing to acknowledge
38 Phillip AKA v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 42 S.W.3d 508, 515 n. 2 (Ark. 2001).
39 Id. at 516-17; see ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102 (2009):
((13) (B) (i) (a) For the purposes of §§ 5-10-101-5-10-105], "person" also includes an un-
born child in utero at any stage of development.
(b) "Unborn child" means a living fetus of twelve (12) weeks or greater gestation.
(ii) This subdivision 13(b) does not apply to:
(a) An act that causes the death of an unborn child in utero if the act was committed
during a legal abortion to which the woman consented;
(b) An act that is committed pursuant to a usual and customary standard of medical
practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment; or
(c) An act that is committed in the course of medical research, experimental medicine,
or an act deemed necessary to save the life or preserve the health of the woman.
2009]
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the unique status of the fetus, the MPA may not have permitted
this outcome.
IX. Conclusion
A federal version of the California bill would have been
more enforceable than the MPA and less polarizing than both
the MPA and the UVVA. Neither side offered such a proposal.
Both sides in the debate over the UVVA were pursuing and pro-
tecting their interests and agendas in offering their versions of
legislation, which sought to accomplish similar goals. As a conse-
quence, support for both proposals suffered. Both sides could
have been closer to each other if stripped of their accompanying
political baggage. But this is how we often produce legislation in
America. We have one eye on the current issue and the other on
politics. This metaphorical lack of focus often results in murky
lawmaking. This, in turn, leads to disputes in the judiciary-as
well as to disputes about the role of the judiciary.
Presidents George Washington and John Adams warned
against the development of political parties.4" Parties were
viewed as selfish and factional.41 They worked against national
unity.42 Washington's and Adam's critique foresaw the phenom-
enon of politics over principle. And while a solution does not
portend nor demand the destruction of parties, it does require
that we think differently about the function of parties. If we are
able to do so, we will give meaning to the words of these foun-
ders' genius.
40 DAVID EDWIN HARRELL, JR., ET. AL, UNTO A GOOD LAND: A HISTORY OF THE AMER-
ICAN PEOPLE 234 (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 2005).
41 Id.
42 Id.
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APPENDIX A
Laci and Conner's Law (Enrolled as Agreed to or
Passed by Both House and Senate)
H.R.1997
One Hundred Eighth Congress
of the
United States of America
AT THE SECOND SESSION
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the twen-
tieth day of January, two thousand and four
An Act
To amend title 18, United States Code, and the Uniform Code
of Military Justice to protect unborn children from assault and
murder, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Unborn Victims of Violence Act of
2004' or 'Laci and Conner's Law'.
SEC. 2. PROTECTION OF UNBORN CHILDREN.
(a) IN GENERAL- Title 18, United States Code, is amended by
inserting after chapter 90 the following:
'CHAPTER 90A-PROTECTION OF UNBORN CHILDREN
'Sec.
'1841. Protection of unborn children.
'Sec. 1841. Protection of unborn children
'(a) (1) Whoever engages in conduct that violates any of the pro-
visions of law listed in subsection (b) and thereby causes the
death of, or bodily injury (as defined in section 1365) to, a child,
who is in utero at the time the conduct takes place, is guilty of a
separate offense under this section.
'(2) (A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the pun-
ishment for that separate offense is the same as the punishment
2009] 233
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provided under Federal law for that conduct had that injury or
death occurred to the unborn child's mother.
'(B) An offense under this section does not require proof that-
'(i) the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or
should have had knowledge that the victim of the underlying
offense was pregnant; or
'(ii) the defendant intended to cause the death of, or bodily in-
jury to, the unborn child.
'(C) If the person engaging in the conduct thereby intentionally
kills or attempts to kill the unborn child, that person shall in-
stead of being punished under subparagraph (A), be punished
as provided under sections 1111, 1112, and 1113 of this title for
intentionally killing or attempting to kill a human being.
'(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death pen-
alty shall not be imposed for an offense under this section.
'(b) The provisions referred to in subsection (a) are the
following:
'(1) Sections 36, 37, 43, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 229, 242, 245,
247, 248, 351, 831, 844(d), (f), (h)(1),
and (i), 924(j), 930, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1116, 1118, 1119,
1120, 1121, 1153(a), 1201(a), 1203, 1365(a), 1501, 1503, 1505,
1512, 1513, 1751, 1864, 1951, 1952 (a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B), and
(a) (3) (B), 1958, 1959, 1992, 2113, 2114, 2116, 2118, 2119, 2191,
2231, 2241(a), 2245, 2261, 2261A, 2280, 2281, 2332, 2332a,
2332b, 2340A, and 2441 of this title.
'(2) Section 408(e) of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (21
U.S.C. 848(e)).
'(3) Section 202 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2283).
'(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the
prosecution-
'(1) of any person for conduct relating to an abortion for which
the consent of the pregnant woman, or a person authorized by
law to act on her behalf, has been obtained or for which such
consent is implied by law;
'(2) of any person for any medical treatment of the pregnant
woman or her unborn child; or
'(3) of any woman with respect to her unborn child.
234 [Vol. 12:223
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'(d) As used in this section, the term 'unborn child' means a
child in utero, and the term 'child in utero' or 'child, who is in
utero' means a member of the species homo sapiens, at any
stage of development, who is carried in the womb.'.
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT- The table of chapters for part I
of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the
item relating to chapter 90 the following new item:
1841'.
SEC. 3. MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM.
(a) PROTECTION OF UNBORN CHILDREN- Subchapter X of
chapter 47 of title 10, United States Code (the Uniform Code of
Military Justice), is amended by inserting after section 919 (arti-
cle 119) the following new section:
'Sec. 919a. Art. 119a. Death or injury of an unborn child
'(a) (1) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in con-
duct that violates any of the provisions of law listed in subsection
(b) and thereby causes the death of, or bodily injury (as defined
in section 1365 of title 18) to, a child, who is in utero at the time
the conduct takes place, is guilty of a separate offense under this
section and shall, upon conviction, be punished by such punish-
ment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct, which
shall be consistent with the punishments prescribed by the Presi-
dent for that conduct had that injury or death occurred to the
unborn child's mother.
'(2) An offense under this section does not require proof that-
'(i) the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or
should have had knowledge that the victim of the underlying
offense was pregnant; or
'(ii) the accused intended to cause the death of, or bodily injury
to, the unborn child.
'(3) If the person engaging in the conduct thereby intentionally
kills or attempts to kill the unborn child, that person shall, in-
stead of being punished under paragraph (1), be punished as
provided under sections 880, 918, and 919(a) of this title (arti-
cles 80, 118, and 119(a)) for intentionally killing or attempting
to kill a human being.
'(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death pen-
alty shall not be imposed for an offense under this section.
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'(b) The provisions referred to in subsection (a) are sections
918, 919(a), 919(b) (2), 920(a), 922, 924, 926, and 928 of this
title (articles 118, 119(a), 119(b)(2), 120(a), 122, 124, 126, and
128).
'(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the
prosecution-
'(1) of any person for conduct relating to an abortion for which
the consent of the pregnant woman, or a person authorized by
law to act on her behalf, has been obtained or for which such
consent is implied by law;
'(2) of any person for any medical treatment of the pregnant
woman or her unborn child; or
'(3) of any woman with respect to her unborn child.
'(d) In this section, the term 'unborn child' means a child in
utero, and the term 'child in utero' or 'child, who is in utero'
means a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of
development, who is carried in the womb.'.
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT- The table of sections at the be-
ginning of such subchapter is amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 919 the following new item:
'919a. 119a. Death or injury of an unborn child.'.
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Vice President of the United States and
President of the Senate.
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APPENDIX B
The Motherhood Protection Act
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Motherhood Protection Act".
SEC. 2. PROTECTION OF PREGNANT WOMEN.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Title 18, United States Code, is amended by
inserting after chapter 90 the following:
"CHAPTER 90A-PROTECTION OF PREGNANT WOMEN
"CHAPTER 90A-PROTECTION OF PREGNANT WOMEN
"Sec. 1841. Causing termination of pregnancy or interruption of
the normal course of pregnancy."
§1841. Causing termination of pregnancy or interruption of the
normal course of pregnancy
"(a) (1) Any person who engages in conduct that violates any of
the provisions of law listed in subsection (b) and thereby causes
the termination of a pregnancy or the interruption of the nor-
mal course of pregnancy, including termination of the preg-
nancy other than by live birth is guilty of a separate offense
under this section.
"(2) (A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the pun-
ishment for that separate offense is the same as the punishment
provided for that conduct under Federal law had that injury or
death occurred to the pregnant woman.
"(B) An offense under this section does not require proof that-
"(i) the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or
should have had knowledge that the victim of the underlying
offense was pregnant; or
"(ii) the defendant intended to cause the termination or inter-
ruption of the normal course of pregnancy.
"(C) If the person engaging in the conduct thereby intentionally
causes or attempts to cause the termination of or the interrup-
tion of the pregnancy, that person shall be punished as provided
under section 1111, 1112, or 1113, as applicable, for intention-
ally terminating or interrupting the pregnancy or attempting to
2009]
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH LAW
do so, instead of the penalties that would otherwise apply under
subparagraph (A).
"(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death pen-
alty shall not be imposed for an offense under this section.
"(b) The provisions referred to in subsection (a) are the
following:
"(1) Sections 36, 37, 43, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 229, 242, 245,
247, 248, 351, 831, 844(d), 844(f), 844(h)(1), 844(i), 924(j),
930, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1116, 1118, 1119, 1120, 1121,
1153(a), 1201(a), 1203, 1365(a), 1501, 1503, 1505, 1512, 1513,
1751, 1864, 1951, 1952(a) (1) (B), 1952(a) (2) (B), 1952(a) (3) (B),
1958, 1959, 1992, 2113, 2114, 2116, 2118, 2119, 2191, 2231,
2241(a), 2245, 2261, 2261A, 2280, 2281, 2332, 2332a, 2332b,
2340A, and 2441 of this title.
"(2) Section 408 (e) of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (21
U.S.C. 848(e)).
"(3) Section 202 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2283).
"(c) Subsection (a) does not permit prosecution-
"(1) for conduct relating to an abortion for which the consent of
the pregnant woman has been obtained or for which such con-
sent is implied by law in a medical emergency;
"(2) for conduct relating to any medical treatment of the preg-
nant woman, or matters related to the pregnancy; or
"(3) of any woman with respect to her pregnancy.".
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.-The table of chapters for part
1 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after
the item relating to chapter 90 the following:
"90A. Protection of pregnant women 1841".
SEC. 3. MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM.
(a) PROTECTION OF PREGNANT WOMEN.-Subchapter X
of chapter 47 of title 10, United States Code (the Uniform Code
of Military Justice), is amended by inserting after section 919 (ar-
ticle 119) the following: "§919a. Art. 119a. Causing termination
of pregnancy or interruption of normal course of pregnancy
"(a) (1) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in con-
duct that violates any of the provisions of law listed in subsection
(b) and thereby causes the termination of a pregnancy or the
interruption of the normal course of pregnancy, including ter-
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mination of the pregnancy other than by live birth, is guilty of a
separate offense under this section.
"(2) (A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the pun-
ishment for that separate offense is the same as the punishment
for that conduct under this chapter had that injury or death oc-
curred to the pregnant woman.
"(B) An offense under this section does not require proof that-
"(i) the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or
should have had knowledge that the victim of the underlying
offense was pregnant; or
"(ii) the defendant intended to cause the termination or inter-
ruption of the normal course of pregnancy.
"(C) If the person engaging in the conduct thereby intentionally
causes or attempts to cause the termination of or the interrup-
tion of the pregnancy, that persons shall be punished as pro-
vided under section 918, 919, or 880 of this title (article 118,
119, or 80), as applicable, for intentionally causing the termina-
tion of or interruption of the pregnancy or attempting to do so,
instead of the penalties that would otherwise apply under sub-
paragraph (A).
"(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death pen-
alty shall not be imposed for an offense under this section.
"(b) The provisions referred to in subsection (a) are sections
918, 919(a), 919(b)(2), 920(a), 922, 924, 926, and 928 of this
title (articles 111, 118, 119(a), 119(b)(2), 120(a), 122, 124, 126,
and 128).
"(c) Subsection (a) does not permit prosecution-
"(1) for conduct relating to an abortion for which the consent of
the pregnant woman has been obtained or for which such con-
sent is implied by law in a medical emergency;
"(2) for conduct relating to any medical treatment of the preg-
nant woman or matters relating to her pregnancy; or
"(3) of any woman with respect to her pregnancy.".
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.-The table of sections at the be-
ginning of subchapter X of chapter 47 of title 10, United States
Code (the Uniform Code of Military Justice), is amended by in-
serting after the item relating to section 919 the following:
"919a. Causing termination of pregnancy and termination of
normal course of pregnancy.".
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APPENDIX C
STANFORD LAW SCHOOL
Stanford, CA, July 10, 2003
Senator Dianne Feinstein
U.S. Senate
Senate Hart Office Building
Washington, DC
Dear Senator Feinstein:
I wish to express my concern about the current formulation
of S. 1019, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2003. Al-
though I fully endorse the Bill's ultimate aim of protecting preg-
nant women from the physical and psychological trauma of an
endangered or lost pregnancy, I believe that the Bill's current
formulation will frustrate rather than forward this goal.
I write both as a former prosecutor and as a law professor
specializing in criminal law and criminal prosecution. At the out-
set of my career, I served as an assistant district attorney in Mid-
dlesex County, Mass., and as an assistant attorney general in the
Massachusetts Attorney General's office. I then went to Boston
College Law School, where I administered and taught in the
criminal prosecution clinic. I have been at Stanford since 1995
and a tenured professor of law since 1999; during the next aca-
demic year, I will serve as Academic Associate Dean. In 1996 I
founded Stanford's criminal prosecution clinic and have admin-
istered and taught in the clinic ever since. I have also created a
course in prosecutorial ethics, which I taught at Boston College
Law School and, as a visitor, at Harvard Law School.
My background and interest in criminal prosecution
prompt me to raise three objections to this Bill. All of them fo-
cus on the Bill's use of the expressions "child in utero" and
"child, who is in utero," and on its definition of these terms as "a
member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of develop-
ment, who is carried in the womb."
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First: The Bill's apparent purpose of influencing the course
of abortion politics will discourage prosecutions under any fu-
ture Act.
I do not know what motives gave rise to the Bill's use of the
expressions "child in utero" and "child, who is in utero," but I do
know that any vaguely savvy reader will conclude that these terms
and the Bill's definition of them were intended by the Bill's au-
thors to influence the course of abortion politics. It is a fair pre-
diction that when a pro-life President is in office, prosecutions
under this Bill will be more frequent than when a pro-choice
President is in office. That is because the public will interpret
this Bill as suggesting that abortion is a potentially criminal act
and will interpret prosecutions under the Bill as endorsing this
sentiment.
If the authors of the Bill truly seek to protect unborn life
from criminal violence, they will better accomplish this purpose
by avoiding such expressions as "child in utero." Better alterna-
tives would refer to injury or death to a fetus or damage to or
termination of a pregnancy.
Second: The Bill's apparent purpose of influencing the
course of abortion politics will motivate prosecutors to exclude
those prospective jurors who otherwise would be most sympa-
thetic to the prosecution's case.
If I were prosecuting a case under this Bill, I would hope to
have a jury that includes persons deeply sensitive to the rights
and interests of pregnant women. Such jurors would regard an
attack on a pregnant woman as being a twofold crime, compris-
ing both the injury directly inflicted on the mother and the stark
emotional and physical trauma resulting from injury to or loss of
her pregnancy.
But such jurors also will be more likely than others to be-
lieve that pregnant women have the right to exercise autonomy
over their bodies and to choose whether to abort a pregnancy. I
predict that many or most judges will bar prosecutors and de-
fense counsel from questioning prospective jurors about their
views on abortion or about related matters such as their religion,
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religious practices, or political affiliations. Forced to act largely
on instinct, prosecutors may be inclined to exercise peremptory
challenges against those prospective jurors who appear to be
most sympathetic to the rights of pregnant women. This result
clearly would frustrate the Bill's stated purpose of protecting un-
born life from criminal violence.
Third: The Bill's apparent purpose of influencing the
course of abortion politics offends the integrity of the criminal
law.
To anyone who cares deeply about the integrity of the crimi-
nal law, this Bill's apparent attempt to insert an abortion broad-
side into the criminal code is greatly offensive. The power to
inflict criminal penalties is, second only to the power to wage
war, the highest trust invested in our institutions of government.
Because the power to make and enforce criminal laws inherently
carries enormous potential for abuse, those who exercise that
power must always do so with a spirit free of any ulterior political
motive. The American Bar Association's Standards Relating to
the Administration of Criminal Justice provide that " [i] n making
the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no weight
to the personal or political advantages or disadvantages which
might be involved ...... " (Standard 3-3.9(d).) Not all prosecu-
tors conduct themselves with fidelity to this principle, but we
may readily condemn those who do not. We may likewise con-
demn other public actors who abuse the sacred public trust of
the criminal sanction for political ends.
For these reasons, I object to the current formulation of the
Unborn Victims of Violence Bill. As I am confident that an alter-
native version of the Bill can fully accomplish its stated purpose
of protecting unborn life from criminal violence while avoiding
each of the difficulties I have outlined above, I strongly en-
courage the Senate to modify the Bill in the ways I have sug-
gested above or in some other manner that avoids the freighted
and frankly politicized terms, "child in utero" and "child, who is
in utero."
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My thanks to you for your consideration of my views.
Sincerely,
George Fisher,
Professor of Law
